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Household borrowing in a foreign currency is a widespread phenomenon in Austria. 
Twelve percent of Austrian households report their housing loan to be denominated in 
either Swiss franc or Japanese yen for example. Yet, despite its importance, peculiar 
character, and immediate policy concerns, we know too little about the attitudes and 
characteristics of the households involved in this type of carry trade.  
We analyze a uniquely detailed financial wealth survey of 2,556 Austrian households 
to sketch a comprehensive profile of the attitudes and characteristics of the 
households involved. We employ both univariate tests and multivariate multinomial 
logit models. 
The survey data suggests that risk-loving, wealthy, and married households are more 
likely to take a housing loan in a foreign currency. High-income households are more 
likely to take a housing loan in general. These findings may partially assuage policy 
concerns about household default risk on foreign-currency housing loans. 
 
Keywords: foreign currency borrowing, mortgages, banking sector, Austria, Swiss 
francs. 
 
JEL: G21, G15, F34, F37. 
I. Introduction 
Investors borrowing in a low-yielding currency and investing in a high-yielding 
one, in a so-called “carry trade”, are now a widespread phenomenon. Galati, Heath, 
and McGuire (2007) for example estimate that the Swiss franc-denominated global 
claims, which likely reflect the amounts of money in carry trade, reached a staggering 
$ 678 billion in the first quarter of 2007, almost double the estimated 2006 Gross 
Domestic Product for Switzerland. 
While large financial institutions and leveraged institutions, such as hedge 
funds, have been traditionally the main parties in most carry trades, in some countries 
carry trade activity is now also widespread among households. In Austria, for 
example, twelve percent of households report their housing loan to be denominated in 
foreign currency, mostly Swiss franc and Japanese yen. 
The choice of the Swiss franc for a housing loan is especially peculiar, as 
Austria adopted the euro immediately in 1999. 320 million people currently use the 
euro as legal tender, less than 8 million people the Swiss franc. Hence, an Austrian 
household taking a housing loan in Swiss franc is in this respect like a Minnesota 
household getting a loan in Canadian dollar, a phenomenon one could dub a 
“dollarization-in-reverse”. 
What makes this widespread borrowing in Swiss franc further noteworthy is 
that Austrian households, which are otherwise known to be conservative investors, 
willingly take extra risks through other novel features of Swiss franc loans, such as its 
variable interest rate and a repayment vehicle often invested in equity.  
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The concern about “household carry traders” being less sophisticated than the 
real ones is therefore not without grounds. “Typical [institutional] carry trade 
investors are steeped in the complexities of currency risk and far more likely to 
protect themselves when engaging in currency bets than ordinary borrowers” (Perry 
(2007)). If indeed financially illiterate and exposed, Austrian household carry traders 
may pose an immediate and systematic credit risk to the lending institutions, should 
an unexpected and sharp appreciation of the Swiss franc coincide with a drop in 
returns on the underlying equity repayment vehicle of the loan, for example, a 
scenario that is not too farfetched but with potentially thorny cross-border policy 
implications. In addition, these carry traders may also be jeopardizing their 
comfortable retirements (as in Lusardi and Mitchell (2007) for example) – possibly an 
Austrian governmental policy concern. 
Yet, despite their widespread presence, peculiar character, and related policy 
concerns, very little is known about the main agents in the household carry trade. This 
paper aims to fill this gap, in two ways. First, we draw upon existing sources to sketch 
a comprehensive profile of the parties and contracts involved in a typical Austrian 
household carry trade. Second, we analyze data from a uniquely detailed 2004   
financial wealth survey of 2,556 Austrian households to determine how financially 
educated, risk averse and wealthy for example the household carry traders are. We 
employ both univariate tests and multivariate (multinomial) logit models to analyze 
the correspondence between household borrowing and the households' attitudes and 
characteristics. 
We find an interesting pattern in the configurations of parties and contracts 
involved in the Austrian household carry trades. In particular, financial advisors that  
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are not directly connected to any of the credit granting institutions seemingly play a 
important role in arranging some of the contracts. Despite the role of these financial 
advisors, the survey data nevertheless suggests that risk-loving, wealthy, and married 
households are more likely to take a housing loan in a foreign currency. High-income 
households are more likely to take a housing loan in general. These findings therefore 
may partially assuage policy concerns about household default risk on foreign 
currency loans. 
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. Section II first describes the recent 
developments and main features of foreign currency household loans in Austria; it 
then discusses the role of the banks and financial advisors in this household carry 
trade, and finally turns its attention to its main players, the households. Section III 
describes the data and our empirical methodology. Section IV discusses the results 
and Section V concludes.  
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II. Austrian Household Carry trades 
A. Household Loans in Foreign Currency 
Loans to Austrian households in foreign currency have been growing rapidly 
since the late 1980s and are now a widespread phenomenon (Figure 1). By the end of 
2007, more than   32 billion ($ 50 billion) were outstanding in loans to Austrian 
households in foreign currency, almost 30 percent of the total amount of loans that 
were made to Austrian households (Figure 1, Top Panel). 
 
[Figure 1 around here] 
 
From the late 1980s to late 2006, annual growth rates of household loans in 
foreign currency exceeded growth rates of household loans in domestic currency by 
far, except during a few months in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Figure 1, Middle 
Panel). Between 1995 and 1999, the amount of household loans in foreign currency 
practically doubled every year, rising from about   480 million in early 1995 to 
almost   13 billion at the end of 1999. Since late 2006, loans in foreign currency are 
becoming somewhat less popular. Loans to households in Swiss franc are by far the 
most common, accounting for more than 95 percent of all household loans in foreign 
currency (Figure 1, Bottom Panel). 
Besides many standard features, these household loans have a few rather 
peculiar characteristics (Würz and Hubmer (2006), Tzanninis (2005)). A typical 
foreign currency loan to an Austrian household is predominantly used for purchasing 
a house and has a size of about EUR 100,000; has a maturity of between 15 and 25  
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years; is secured by real estate collateral but has a lower loan-to-value ratio (usually 
70%) than a comparable euro-denominated loan; it usually also has a variable interest 
rate that is set at a spread of around 150 basis points above the 3-month LIBOR of the 
respective loan currency and repriced every three months; is a balloon loan (involving 
monthly payments of interest only, with full principal repaid at maturity); offers the 
borrower the option to switch to another currency (including the euro) at contractually 
specified roll-over dates (usually the repricing dates) for a fee; has forced conversion 
clauses, allowing the bank to convert the loan into a euro loan at any time without the 
borrower's consent; and is usually coupled with a repayment vehicle (usually a life 
insurance contract or a mutual fund) to which monthly payments are made and which 
is to be used to repay the principal at maturity. 
We now describe the main parties in the market for household loans in foreign 
currency. We focus our discussion on the housing loans in Swiss franc. This type of 
loans is the most prevalent and a description of their main characteristics can be 
reasonably well pieced together from the various sources we had access to. We first 
briefly discuss the supply by banks of Swiss franc housing loans and then describe the 
role of the financial advisors as brokers. The main focus of this discussion and our 
subsequent empirical analysis will be on the households, however, as it is their 
demand that seems to be driving this market. 
B. Supply by Banks 
Banks claim that the market for Swiss franc housing loans is actually very 
demand-driven and that the intensity of competition in the Austrian banking sector 
does not allow them not to offer Swiss franc housing loans (Jetzer (2005)). This claim  
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is consistent with the findings of Tzanninis (2005) and the observation by Boss 
(2003), p. 45, that intermediation spreads
1 in the Austrian banking sector are lower in 
foreign currency lending (110 to 140 basis points) than in domestic currency lending 
(200 to 400 basis points). However, banks’ claims could also be partly self-serving. 
To minimize legal and reputational risks, banks indeed need to be very careful not to 
be seen pushing Swiss franc loans and allege especially to worry about the possible 
legal actions of the many debtors if these loans turn out to be a bad investment (Boss 
(2003)). 
Besides worrying about the legal issues in offering Swiss franc housing loans, 
Austrian banks also face a potential currency mismatch between these loans and their 
deposits that are mainly in euros. To refinance their Swiss-franc loans, Austrian banks 
are relying mainly on Swiss-franc-denominated interbank loans, issuance of Swiss-
franc-denominated securities, or off-balance-sheet transactions denominated in that 
currency (e.g. currency swaps). For large banks, such refinancing may have turned 
out to be actually less expensive than attracting more core deposits (Boss (2003)). But 
for the many banks in Vorarlberg and Tyrol for example (where Swiss franc 
borrowing is most widespread) that are small and not rated themselves, interbank 
borrowing can be a more expensive or less accessible source of funding than core 
deposits. The few foreign banks that are also sourced in Swiss franc are not major 
providers of Swiss franc housing loans. Securitization of Swiss franc loans is also not 
a viable option as there is simply no demand for it.  
                                                 
1 The intermediation spread is defined as the difference between the average interest rate charged on 
lending to non-banks and the average rate charged on interest-bearing liabilities (interbank deposits, 
customer deposits, own securities issued).  
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Banks also need to deal with the currency-risk-induced credit risk embedded in 
the Swiss franc housing loans. As mentioned, most Swiss franc loan contracts allow 
banks to force conversion into the euro, an option banks will use if the borrower 
cannot afford the loan any more (for example, in case the household’s income 
dropped). Surprisingly, exchange rate fluctuations are not that important in this 
context. A few years ago, for example, when the appreciation of the yen against the 
euro led to widespread losses for the households and − consequently − increases in 
credit risk for the banks, industry observers noted that banks rarely triggered the 
conversion clause on any of the many yen loans they then had in their portfolios. 
Forced conversion − it is widely recognized − gives rise to problems in practice as 
borrowers may contest the banks’ assessment and expectations about the current and 
future macro-economic conditions. And unless the borrower is in a distressed – and 
hence weakened – position, the banks may be unwilling to go through this trouble. 
C. Brokerage by Independent Financial Advisors 
In contrast to banks, independent financial advisors and financial advisory firms 
(like AWD) seemingly market Swiss franc loans more actively to bolster and sustain 
household demand (Boss (2003); Tzanninis (2005)). Data from the 2004 financial 
wealth survey of Austrian households for example (we will describe the survey in 
more detail later and employ it in our empirical investigation) suggests that 
independent financial advisors are an important source of information on financial 
matters for households that have taken out foreign currency loans. 27 percent of 
households with a foreign currency loan mentioned independent financial advisors as 
one of their information sources on financial matters, compared to only 13 percent of  
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households that have taken out a loan in euros. Households with foreign currency 
loans consult their bank only slightly less often (86 percent) than households with a 
euro loan (88 percent). 
Why are independent financial advisors apparently less apprehensive about 
pushing Swiss franc loans, because – as banks – advisors are also liable for their 
advice?
2 The sales commissions involved may provide an explanation. Indeed, 
independent financial advisors receive sales commissions also on the repayment 
vehicles (in particular those based on life insurance products) that underpin most 
Swiss franc loans. These may provide the advisors with monetary incentives to prefer 
pushing Swiss franc loans. Often it is not even possible to amortize Swiss franc loans 
in a regular way, especially not (and this should therefore not come as a surprise) 
when obtaining these loans through independent financial advisors, a study by the 
Bundesministerium für Soziales und Konsumentenschutz suggests (BMSK (2007)). 
How can independent financial advisors actually push Swiss franc loans? The 
way independent financial advisors operate in general may determine the choice 
households make. It is not clear whether independent financial advisors usually 
include an all-in-cost comparison of euro and Swiss franc loans. If financial advice 
focuses only on the nominal interest rate differential, this may have convinced 
households to borrow in Swiss franc, as Swiss franc loans will always have appeared 
cheaper. 
D. Demand by Households 
                                                 
2 Though admittedly, as the loans are eventually taken from the banks, it seems not easy to separate the 
banks entirely from the independent financial advisors in this “game”.  
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1. Reasons for Carry Trade 
a) Interest Rate 
One of the main reasons for the attractiveness of Swiss franc loans appears to be 
that interest rates on such loans have been lower than comparable interest rates in 
euro (and its predecessor currencies) during most of the recent past (Abele and 
Schäfer (2003), Boss (2003), Tzanninis (2005)). In addition, the exchange rate of the 
franc vis-à-vis the euro (and the currencies of the Deutsche Mark block) has been — 
and is still perceived to be — quasi-fixed. This perception is not surprising given that 
the volatility of the franc/euro exchange rate has been very low for a protracted period 
of time (compared to other exchange rates in the same or other time periods). 
Studying the fundamental determinants of the demand for foreign currency loans in 
Austria over the period 1987-2004, Tzanninis (2005) finds that positive Austrian-
Swiss and Austrian-Japanese interest rate differentials and expectations of mean-
reverting Swiss franc and Japanese yen exchange rates have indeed played a major 
role in the growth of such loans. 
As Austrian households taking a housing loan in Swiss franc indeed borrow in a 
low interest rate currency to “invest” (in housing) in a higher yielding one (the euro), 
and as household currency exposure is in principle always reversible thanks to the 
currency switching option, Austrian households have been and still are essentially  
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operating as carry traders.
3 However, they may lack the required financial 
sophistication to succeed in their “currency bet”. 
b) Repayment Vehicle 
There are indeed some grounds for concern in this regard. Households may 
have been injudiciously attracted by the combination of the Swiss franc loan and the 
underlying repayment vehicle. Observers reckon households are unable to discern the 
composing financial parts of the loan and therefore view the resulting “structured 
product” as a kind of “auto-amortizing mortgage”, whereby the savings in interest 
payments and the higher expected returns from the repayment vehicle are themselves 
providing the resources to amortize the loan. 
At the end of June 2007, more than 70% of foreign currency loans to 
households were indeed balloon loans coupled to a repayment vehicle (Lamatsch 
(2007)). And foreign currency loans with a remaining maturity exceeding ten years 
actually almost always feature an underlying repayment vehicle (see Figure 2 and 
Zöllner and Schubert (2007), p. 17). Unfortunately there is no information available 
on the typical currency of the repayment vehicle. One would need to know which 
mutual funds are part of the repayment vehicle, for example, and the currency split of 
the investments of these funds. This information was not solicited in the 2004 
financial wealth survey and seems not available elsewhere. 
 
[Figure 2 around here] 
                                                 
3 The 2004 financial wealth survey unfortunately does not contain any information on the currency of 




Though repayment vehicles are also possible on euro loans, they are rarely used 
in practice. Only 5% of euro loans to households were balloon loans coupled to a 
repayment vehicle (Lamatsch (2007)). One reason may be that such balloon euro 
loans (with or without repayment vehicle) are more expensive than comparable 
amortizing euro loans. Another reason could be that households regard balloon euro 
loans with repayment vehicle as more risky than comparable foreign currency loans, 
in the sense that to achieve similar returns as with foreign currency loans, they figure 
they would need to invest directly in even more risky assets. Here again a worrying 
lack of financial sophistication might be at play.  
c) Fees and Loan Currency 
Fees may have an impact on, if not the choice of the loan currency, then at least 
the amount borrowed in foreign currency. Regular bank fees seem not higher on 
Swiss franc loans than on euro loans for comparable services, various surveys run by 
the Arbeiterkammer Wien suggest.
4 But the “catch” seems to be the various fees and 
commissions on all the foreign currency components of the transaction, e.g., the 
currency conversion fee paid each time interest or amortization payments are made, 
the fixed fee of having an underlying foreign currency bank account in addition to the 
regular account in euros, or the fee for switching currencies. Back-of-the-envelope 
calculations suggest these additional fees may make it unprofitable for borrowers to 
                                                                                                                                            
households will invest relatively more in the domestic, higher yielding currency (euro). 
4 See Prantner (2005) and Kollmann and Prantner (2006) for example.  
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obtain loans of less than 73,000 euros and 20 years duration in Swiss franc (Prantner 
(2005)). 
Fees have been relatively constant for some years now. Earlier in time the 
variability in fees was more pronounced on Swiss franc loans. Changes occur more 
often in fees that are either somewhat hidden to and/or conditional on the state of the 
borrower. Banks are often willing to negotiate both the fees and the spread over the 
LIBOR over a wide range. 
d) Herding 
In sum, Austrian households seemingly engage in some form of carry trade, 
placing a bet on the Swiss franc, lured by the underlying repayment vehicle and 
possibly partly unaware of all future fees involved. Questions can therefore be raised 
about the households’ ability to understand and bear the risks involved, even more so 
because one of the explanations for the rapid growth of Swiss franc loans in Austria is 
herd behavior (Waschiczek (2002)). 
The practice of taking out foreign currency loans started in Vorarlberg, the 
Austrian federal state bordering Switzerland, where tens of thousands of Austrians 
commute to work in Switzerland and Liechtenstein. Not surprisingly, most foreign 
currency loans are in Swiss franc. Already at the end of the 1980s, the share of 
foreign currency loans in total household loans was around 5% in Vorarlberg, while it 
was a mere 0.2% in Austria as a whole (Waschiczek (2002), p. 85). Even then it was 
clear that more than just those households that received part of their income in Swiss 
franc (because of cross-border business) were engaged in Swiss franc borrowing.  
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From around 1995 on, the phenomenon started to spread eastwards within 
Austria (Tzanninis (2005)) and this pattern of geographical diffusion is not 
inconsistent with herding, exacerbating potential concerns one may have about the 
positions Austrian households are taking. Tzanninis (2005) concludes that the rapid 
spread of foreign currency loans among households after 1995 seems to reflect to a 
significant extent herd behavior. 
2. Qualifications
a) Interest Rate Arbitrage 
A number of qualifications on the potential riskiness of these carry trade “bets” 
are in order, however. According to Abele and Schäfer (2003), for example, the 
differential between three-month euro and Swiss franc interest rates (LIBOR) has on 
average been 1 to 1.7 percentage points higher than the average annual appreciation 
of the franc over the past 30 years, making a loan in Swiss franc rational arbitrage, at 
least ex post. Even the (credit) spread over the reference interest rate that is being paid 
by borrowers may be lower on Swiss franc loans than on domestic currency loans 
(Abele and Schäfer (2003), pp. 23-24 and p. 45).
5 
Ultimately it seems that taking a Swiss franc loan is taking a bet on a de facto 
fixed exchange rate regime. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), for example, classify 
Switzerland’s exchange rate regime as a de facto moving band around the Deutsche
Mark / euro, with a band width of +/- 2 percent. In recent years the Swiss franc has 
                                                 
5 Though numbers released by the Oesterreichische Nationalbank seem not to confirm this spread 
differential (OeNB Press Release of October 16
th, 2003).  
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actually even been depreciating vis-à-vis the euro, pushing existing carry trade bets 
even deeper into the money. 
b) Currency Switching Option and Collateralization 
Further qualifying the classification of all Swiss franc loans taken out by 
Austrian households as ill-conceived bets is the presence in the loan contracts of a 
currency switching option allowing conversion to euros at the contractually specified 
roll-over date. It is not entirely clear, however, how common this option is. In the 
earlier cited study by the Bundesministerium für Soziales und Konsumentenschutz 
(BMSK (2007)), for example, the currency switching option is reported to be 
available in only 14 out of the 25 analyzed contracts, and in five out of these contracts 
conversion itself is actually dependent on the bank’s consent and hence potentially 
less valuable. 
On the other hand, Dlaska (2002), Boss (2003) and conversations with an 
experienced industry observer suggest that the currency switching option is common 
(though not legally mandatory). Currency switching seems to occur often at the 
contractually specified roll-over dates. Switching fees seem not excessive and in line 
with common foreign exchange transactions (though fee structures vary considerably 
among lenders, see Kollmann and Prantner (2006)). Switching further seems almost 
tax neutral and switching was never perceived to be a problem until now, except in 
the rare case borrowers would want to switch to another carry trade currency and in 
the eyes of the financiers would take on excessive risk. Remember also that forced 
conversion clauses allow the bank to convert the loan into a euro loan at any time 
without the borrower's consent.  
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Though we lack precise data on actual switching behavior, the bottom panel of 
Figure 1 suggests that households in aggregate switched away from Japanese yen 
loans between October 2002 (the start of available data) and May 2007. During this 
period, characterized by a depreciation of the yen against the euro of about 30%, the 
euro amount of yen loans outstanding dropped by more than 90%, from over 50% of 
total foreign currency loans to just below 3%. While part of this drop is a mechanical 
consequence of the yen depreciation and another part might be due to maturing loans, 
the major part of the decline must be due to currency switching. Still, it is possible 
that Austrian households do not switch currency often enough because of the 
switching fees. Exchange rate volatility and interest rate volatility make the option to 
delay switching also valuable. But sluggish switching may also be an incorrect 
financial decision made by the households. Lack of financial education may be a 
potential cause (see Campbell (2006) on the optimal refinancing of fixed rate 
mortgages by US households). 
Foreign currency loans usually have higher collateral requirements than 
comparable euro loans (Dlaska (2002), p. 878; Boss (2003), p. 18). While the types of 
collateral required are similar, loan-to-value ratios tend to differ: they are around 30% 
for foreign currency loans and around 20% for euro loans. In addition, banks usually 
grant a foreign currency loan only under the condition that the borrower is also able to 
service a euro loan of similar size. 
c) Not Only Herding 
It is also not clear that herding is a major factor in the popularity of Swiss franc 
loans in Austria. For example, households that take out foreign currency loans spend  
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more time comparing the different financing possibilities, seem better educated , and 
mention friends and colleagues significantly less often (28 percent) as an information 
source than households with a traditional euro housing loan (46 percent), a recent 
study shows (market-Institut (2003)). 
In addition, recent household borrowing in Swiss franc not only in Germany 
and France,
6 but also in countries that have no border with Switzerland, such as 
Denmark (Bernstein (2007)), Greece (Perry (2007)), Hungary, Poland, the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia for example (Saunders (2007)), suggests other drivers may 
also be at work.
7 In the case of the central and eastern European countries, some 
Austrian banks may actually have played a role in spreading the loans in Swiss franc. 
d) Neutral Taxation 
Finally, it also important to note that taxation seems to play an almost neutral 
role in the choice of loan currency, such that foreign currency borrowing by 
households in Austria is not merely an unintended consequence of some tax 
regulation. 
Deduction of interest rate payments is not possible in Austria if a house was 
bought for private purposes. In addition, the notional rental value is not taxed. 
Expenses for building or other home-related expenses can be tax relevant as special 
expenses. If the notional rental value of an owner-occupied residential property is 
taxed as income but interest payments on loans can be deducted from income, as is 
                                                 
6 Total loans denominated in Swiss franc to domestic non-monetary financial institutions for end-2007, 
in billion Swiss francs: Austria: 68.9, Germany: 35.3, France: 22.7 (Source: central bank websites). 
7 During the 1980s mortgages in Swiss franc (and Japanese yen) were also common in the UK, but the 
depreciation of the sterling ended their popularity, painfully for some households (Saunders (2007)).  
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the case in Switzerland for example, homeowners may have an incentive to obtain 
mortgages with interest payments that are greater than or equal to the notional rental 
value. In that case, higher household income and likelihood of owning a home may go 
hand in hand with a higher likelihood of obtaining a housing loan. 
Housing subsidies are important in Austria, but are often granted irrespective of 
the choice of loan currency. In some federal states (Bundesländer) though, housing 
subsidies may be given in form of a low interest rate loan in euros. The effect on 
household demand for Swiss franc loans may therefore be ambiguous, increasing 
household possibilities to invest in housing while reducing the attractiveness of a 
foreign currency loan per se as seemingly cheap financing in euros is available. 
Taxation is further neutral regarding the repayment vehicles that can be used. 
Not only mutual funds but also life insurance products can be employed, and capital 
income from the latter set of products remains exempt from taxation. On the other 
hand, gains stemming from exchange rate changes are taxable, but only if conversion 
occurs within one year after the loan was taken out. But if the loan was taken out to 
finance property that is subsequently rented, changes in the interest payment will have 
an impact on the tax payments by the household. To conclude, it seems difficult to 
argue that taxation is a strong unidirectional factor determining the choice of loan 
currency. 
3. Concerns Nevertheless 
The strong demand for Swiss franc loans in Austria may be driven by the 
interest differential between Swiss franc and euro borrowing, which for extended  
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periods of time now has made Swiss franc borrowing an act of rational arbitrage, at 
least ex post. 
However, the somewhat murky role financial advisors played in the sales 
process, the suspicion that households may lack the necessary financial education to 
separate the loan from its repayment vehicle and recognize all future fees, and a 
geographical diffusion in Austria not incompatible with herding seem to necessitate 
further research into the characteristics of the borrowers involved in this peculiar 
Austrian household carry trade. 




III. Data and Empirical Model 
A. Data 
Our sample is drawn from an existing survey about Austrian households’ 
financial wealth that was commissioned by the Oesterreichische Nationalbank 
(OeNB) and conducted by the market research institute FESSEL-GfK during the 
summer and fall of 2004.
8 The purpose of the survey was to gather micro data on 
private households’ financial wealth, investment, and debt. The survey consisted of a 
15-page questionnaire containing 87 questions about households’ socio-demographic 
characteristics; types, amounts, and sources of asset and debt holdings; information 
sources about financial market topics; and attitudes towards, and knowledge of, 
financial market issues. 
Households were stratified by federal state, except for Vienna where households 
were stratified by the 23 political districts. The survey was carried out through a mix 
of face-to-face and written interviews. The interview partner was the household head 
or the household member with the most accurate knowledge about the household’s 
finances. Analyzable data sets from 2,556 households were compiled, corresponding 
to a response rate of 54.9 percent (1,026 of 1,869 households) for Vienna and 63.5% 
(1,530 of 2,408 households) for the remaining eight federal states. 
                                                 
8 For more details about this survey, see Beer, Mooslechner, Schürz, and Wagner (2006).  
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B. Loan Type as Dependent Variable 
Households taking the survey report their outstanding loans. We categorize the 
2,556 sample households into six groups according to the type of loan they report 
(Figure 3). 
 
[Figure 3 around here] 
 
First, we distinguish households that have a loan from those that do not. Then, 
among the borrowers, we distinguish those that have a housing loan from those that 
have taken out another type of loan. Finally, among those reporting a housing loan, 
we distinguish those with a housing loan denominated in euros from those with a 
housing loan denominated in foreign currency. 
A few households have more than one type of loan and can thus be assigned to 
more than one of these categories. Figure 3 implies that 103 households have both a 
housing loan and also another type of loan, and 40 households have both a housing 
loan in euro and a housing loan in foreign currency. In the following empirical 
investigation, the number of observations used is 2,699 (=2,556+103+40) but multiple 
observations for a single household are appropriately down-weighted. Randomly 
retaining only one observation per household does not alter our findings.  
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Our dependent variable is the choice by the household of one of the four branch 
ends in Figure 3. These categories are: (1) No Loan, (2) Other Loan, (3) Housing 
Loan in Euros, and (4) Housing Loan in Foreign Currency.
9  
C. Multinomial Logit Model 
This dependent variable is categorical, but the categories cannot be ordered in 
any directly meaningful way. In addition, our explanatory variables comprise only 
household characteristics, and do not include variables specific to the options being 
chosen. We therefore opt for the multinomial logistic regression (or multinomial 
logit) model and pick the Housing Loan in Euros as the comparison category. For 
household i the choice model for the loan type can consequently be written as: 

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, for  4 ,..., 1 = j .    (1) 
4 β  can be set equal to the zero vector as a normalization and thus: 

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.   (2) 
As a result, the  j







log ,  3 ,..., 1 = j .        ( 3 )  
                                                 
9 Other categorization schemes, such as splitting the Other Loan into Other Loan in Euro and Other 
Loan in Foreign Currency, or removing the Other Loan category altogether, for example, does not alter 




Given the non-linear form of the multinomial logit model, in the tables we will 
at once report the marginal effect of each covariate at its mean and at the mean of all 
other explanatory variables. 
D. Household Characteristics as Explanatory Variables 
The household characteristics we retain for this study can be grouped into a set 
of subjective and a set of objective variables. The subjective variables include those 
that rely on answers to questions about the financial education and risk-aversion of 
the interviewed main decision-maker in the household. The objective variables on the 
other hand are the answers to straightforward questions about location, income, 
wealth, age, marital status, household size, employment, and education. Most of the 
objective variables are commonly featured in studies estimating the household 
demand for debt (Crook (2006)) and are most likely also to influence the choice of 
loan type.
10 
1. Subjective Variables 
a) Financial Education 
The exact structure and wording of questions in surveys are important, 
especially when assessing subjective questions about financial saviness and risk-
aversion. Hence we maintain the original structure and wording of the original 
questions in the definition of the variables we report in Table 1. We translated the 
original questions in German, a language all three co-authors of this study speak (to 
                                                 
10 Following the seminal work by Campbell and Cocco (2003), papers that study the choice between 
fixed and adjustable rate mortgages feature household location, wealth, income, marital status, size, 
employment, and education, among other variables (see Paiella and Pozzolo (2007) for example).  
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varying degree of fluency), into English ourselves. Table 1 also indicates in the third 
column whether the answer to question pertains to the household, its head or its head 
and partner. 
 
[Table 1 around here] 
 
A first aspect of financial education is captured by d(Indifferent), a dummy 
variable that equals zero if the surveyee likes to deal with financial issues and one if 
he or she does not. Notice that in order to maintain the structure and wording of the 
original question, but at the same time to facilitate coefficient interpretation, the 
variable definition is somewhat non-standard. 
The dummy variable d(Ignorant) equals one if the surveyee agrees that he/she is 
not well informed about financial issues and fully relies on advice from the bank, and 
equals zero otherwise (i.e., if the surveyee does not agree with being uninformed). 
A third financial saviness variable is d(Negligent). This dummy variables equals 
one if the surveyee agrees with the statement that “once I have decided on an 
investment product I want to have to deal with it as little as possible – that’s the 
bank’s job”, and equals zero if the surveyee does not agree.  
Finally, a fourth financial saviness variable is d(Passive) which equals zero if 
the surveyee agrees always to look at various banks’ offers to find the best product, 
and equals one if he/she does not agree with this statement. 
The four financial saviness variables capture various aspects of the household's 
education and attitude towards financial products and decisions. If households act 
rationally and in accordance with their own self-assessment on this account, we  
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expect less financially “educated” households to avoid carry trades and hence housing 
loans in foreign currency.  
These four variables measure quite different aspects of financial knowledge. 
The survey data show that the people surveyed do not answer these questions 
uniformly. For example 69% of those that like to deal with financial issues (i.e., are 
not indifferent), 60% of those that are not ignorant, and 68% of those that always look 
at various bank offers (i.e., are not passive) want to deal as little as possible with an 
investment product after they have decided on it (i.e., are negligent). Conversely, 56% 
of those that do not shop around for the best offer (i.e., are passive) and 60% of those 
that do not want to deal with an investment product after the initial decision (i.e., are 
negligent) like to deal with financial issues (i.e., are not indifferent). Not surprisingly 
therefore the Spearman correlation coefficients that are tabulated in Table 2 between 
the four financial education variables are very low. 
 
[Table 2 around here] 
 
b) Risk Aversion 
Next we construct three measures for the household’s aversion to risk. The 
dummy variable d(Risk Aversion) equals zero if the surveyee agrees with the 
statement “When I invest, a high return is more important to me than a lot of 
security,” and equals one if the surveyee does not agree. d(Bank Risk Aversion) equals 
one if the surveyee thinks banks often grant loans too light-heartedly, and zero 
otherwise. Finally, d(Stock Risk Aversion) equals one if the surveyee thinks stock  
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investment is too risky and equals zero if the surveyee doesn’t think so. In all cases 
risk-averse households may want to, and consequently be expected to, avoid carry 
trades through taking a housing loan in another currency than the euro. 
As with the financial education variables, the risk aversion variables measure 
different dimensions of risk aversion. For example, 75% of those that do not think 
that investment in stocks is too risky (i.e., are stock risk loving) do not find that high 
return is more important than a lot of security (i.e. are risk averse). Table 2 shows that 
the variable d(Bank Risk Aversion) is only weakly correlated with the two other risk 
variables d(Risk Aversion) and d(Stock Risk Aversion). Financial education and risk 
aversion variables in general are not very highly correlated. 
2. Objective Variables 
We also include a number of key objective variables in our multinomial logit 
models. A variable Distance to Swiss Border assigns a value to each province that is 
increasing in the distance to the border. In particular, the variable equals one for 
households that are located in the federal state of Vorarlberg, two for a location in 
Tyrol, three for Salzburg and Carinthia, four for Upper Austria and Styria, and five 
for Lower Austria, Vienna, and Burgenland. People living close to the border may 
have income in Swiss franc (e.g., because they work in Switzerland), making a loan in 
franc a natural hedge and not a carry trade stricto sensu. More banks may also offer 
loans in Swiss franc in the border region. 
We further include the log of monthly Income and financial Wealth, both in 
euros. The correspondence between income and wealth may be complex. Higher-
earning and richer households may be less likely to take a housing loan but, if really  
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wealthy, more likely to engage in carry trades when doing so. In a robustness check, 
we also introduce a dummy variable d(Top Wealth Class) that equals one if the 
financial wealth of the household is in the top 5 percentile and equals zero otherwise. 
As control variables we also include Age, in years, Age^2 to capture life-cycle 
savings dynamics, a dummy marital status variable d(Married), the Number of 
Children younger than or equal to 14 years, and the Number of Adults in the 
household. A dummy d(Civil Servant) equals one if the household head or his/her 
partner is a civil servant and equals zero otherwise. On the other hand a dummy 
variable d(Self-Employed) equals one if the household head or his/her partner is self-
employed and equals zero otherwise. Most civil servants have a safe source of income 
while most self-employed people face a more risky income stream. This may 
determine the willingness to undertake additional speculative carry trades. While self-
employed people may also be more risk-loving by nature, risk aversion variation 
should be already captured by the three subjective risk-aversion variables. Finally, a 
variable  Education equals one if the key household decision-maker has at most 
compulsory grammar school, equals two if at most high school, and equals three if his 
or her educational level is more than high school.  
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IV. Results and Discussion 
A. Univariate Tests 
Table 3 lists the means of the explanatory variables for all surveyed households 
as well as for the six categories depicted in Figure 3. The differences between the 
means at each of the three levels in the categorization tree are also indicated, together 
with the significance levels of a t-test of differences assuming unequal variances. 
 
[Table 3 around here] 
 
Though only univariate, the results are interesting per se. Households with a 
loan seem more financially educated and less risk-averse than those households who 
do not borrow. Borrowers further live somewhat closer to the Swiss border, receive 
528 euros more in monthly income,
11 but have 4,620 euros less in wealth, are 13 
percentage points more likely to contain a civil servant and 3 percentage points more 
likely to include a self-employed person. The reference person is on average 9 years 
younger, 15 percentage points more likely to be married, and has a better education. 
Theses households are also larger with 0.3 more children and 0.4 more adults. 
Among those households that borrow, households with a housing loan seem 
more financially educated and possibly more risk-averse than those households with 
another loan. Households taking out a housing loan also live somewhat closer to the 
Swiss border, have 25,094 euros more in wealth, are 7 percentage points more likely  
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to be married, with 0.2 more children, and the household head is somewhat more 
educated. 
Most interesting for our purpose is the comparison between households with a 
housing loan in euros and households with a housing loan in foreign currency. 
Foreign currency borrowers seem unambiguously less financially uneducated (less 
indifferent, ignorant, negligent and passive) and less risk-averse than euro borrowers. 
Foreign currency borrowers live significantly closer to the Swiss border, receive 543 
euros more in monthly income, have 19,678 euros more in wealth. The household 
with a foreign currency loan is 6 percentage points more likely to contain a civil 
servant and 8 percentage points more likely to include a self-employed person, with 
0.3 more children living in the household. Its head is somewhat more educated, 5 
years younger and 20 percentage points more likely to be married. 
To conclude, the Austrian households that obtain a housing loan in foreign 
currency are significantly more financially educated but less risk averse than any 
other category we consider. They also live closer to Switzerland, have a higher 
income, are more wealthy, younger, more likely to be married, with more children 
and more adults in the household, are more likely to be employed as civil servant or 
self-employed, and are more likely to be well educated than any other category. From 
a policy perspective this group seems better suited than any other to “engage in carry 
trades”. 
                                                                                                                                            
11 As we use the median values for each of the twenty income ranges indicated in the survey, the 
comparisons of the mean income for each of the loan categories are only indicative.  
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B. Multivariate Tests 
We now investigate whether these univariate findings hold up in a multivariate 
setting. We focus on the category of households with a housing loan in foreign 
currency. For ease of assessment, Table 4 reports immediately the imputed partial 
derivative estimates from (multinomial) logit regressions of household characteristics 
on the choice of loan type. 
Each estimated and reported partial derivative measures the change in 
probability of observing a given loan type,  ) Pr(L , given a small change in a 
regressor,  Z , holding all other variables constant at their sample means, Z , i.e. the 
table reports  Z Z L ) / ) Pr( ( ∂ ∂ .
12 Hence, as is common, we calculate the marginal 
effects at the mean as a good (asymptotically valid) approximation of the average 
marginal effects (Greene (1997), p. 876). For ease of interpretation and comparison 
we follow the same procedure for our dummy and categorical independent variables, 
as none of these variables describe different categories of a single variable (Bartus 
(2005)). 
The sums of the estimated partial derivatives equal zero across the four loan 
types (No Loan, Other Loan, Housing Loan in Euros, Housing Loan in Foreign 
Currency) of the multinomial logit model because the sums of the probabilities must 
equal one. The number of observations used is 2,688.
13 
 
                                                 
12 For dummy variables, the reported marginal effects represent the change in probability of observing 
a given loan type following a change in the dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
13 When taking natural logarithms, we drop the 10 households—one of them possessing two types of 
loans— reporting zero wealth, resulting in a loss of 11 observations (i.e., 2,688=2699-11).  
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[Table 4 around here] 
 
In Model I we feature all subjective financial education and risk-aversion 
measures; in Model II we retain only the Indifference and Risk Aversion variable 
(other variable line-ups give similar results). Given the focus of this paper we also 
report the results from a simple logit model (Model Ib) that isolates the currency 
choice for the housing loan. Here, the number of observations used is 740.
14 
Overall the results from simple multivariate exercises are consistent with the 
univariate tests, with a few qualifications. Low risk aversion makes it more likely that 
an Austrian household takes out a housing loan in foreign currency. Proximity to the 
Swiss border,
15 higher income, age, and marital status also make this choice more 
likely. 
Notice that the estimates for the No Loan category can be readily compared to 
other findings in the literature. Households having a higher income, lower wealth, an 
older head, more children and more adults are more likely to take a loan, we find. Our 
results on income and household size are as such fully in line with most studies 
(Crook (2006), Table 3.4). While age seems mostly insignificant in other studies, 
wealth also sometimes has a negative sign. 
 
[Table 5 around here] 
                                                 
14 When taking natural logarithms, we drop the 4 households reporting zero wealth among the 89 
households with a housing loan in foreign currency and the 655 households with a housing loan in 
euro, resulting in 740 observations (i.e., 740=89+655-4). 
15 Replacing Distance to Swiss Border with regional dummies does not alter the coefficients on the 
other variables. The coefficients on the dummy variables themselves are suggestive of a decrease in 




In Table 5 we replace the log of wealth by a dummy variable d(Top Wealth 
Class) that equals one if financial wealth of the household is in the top 5 percentile, 
and equals zero otherwise. Here, the logit results suggest that very wealthy 
households with a loan are 17 percent more likely to have a housing loan in foreign 
currency than a housing loan in euros.
16 Otherwise results are mostly unaffected: 
Austrian households that have low risk aversion, live close to the Swiss border, have 
higher income, age, and are married, are more likely to obtain a housing loan in 
foreign currency than households that have higher risk aversion, live farther from the 
Swiss border, have lower income, age, and are single. 
Table 5 also features an additional assessment of economic relevancy of the 
estimated coefficients (the reported marginal effects of course allow already such an 
assessment). The bottom three rows of the table report the actual probabilities of each 
loan type (calculated from Table 3), the mean of the predicted probabilities when 
taking the household characteristics actually observed, and the mean of the predicted 
probabilities for a household that is risk loving, living in Vorarlberg, in the top 5% 
wealth bracket and married, but with otherwise mean characteristics. The probability 
of taking a housing loan in foreign currency for this subset of households increases 
from 3% to 48% and 37%, respectively, in the two multinomial logit models, and 
from 11% to 81% in the simple logit model. 
                                                 
16 Austrians have become wealthier over the last few decades, possibly providing a partial explanation 




Though seemingly robust as such, our results are subject to a number of obvious 
caveats. The data clearly does not allow us to disentangle demand and supply factors, 
and our multivariate model is a simple reduced-form. In addition, households without 
debt may never have applied for credit or may have been denied credit. Imposing 
somewhat more structure on the empirical model (though admittedly also ad hoc) by 
estimating a nested multinomial logit model − whereby the decision to have a loan is 
followed by a loan type decision and then a loan currency decision − does not alter 
our main findings. 
Further, we only know that a household has taken out a loan but we do not 
know when. Hence, we cannot take into account differences in interest rates and 
exchange rates at the time the loan was taken, for example. Also the characteristics of 
the household may have changed since the loan was obtained. On the other hand, loan 
decisions are to some extent reversible or loans are convertible such that current 
household attributes may also matter. We leave to future research the further 
investigation of these potential drivers for the household to take out a housing loan in 




Twelve percent of Austrian households report their housing loan to be 
denominated in foreign currency, mostly Swiss franc and Japanese yen. Yet, despite 
its importance, peculiar character, and immediate policy concerns, we know too little 
about the attitudes and characteristics of the main agents in this Austrian carry trade.  
We draw upon existing sources and analyze a uniquely detailed 2004 financial 
wealth survey of 2,556 Austrian households to sketch a comprehensive profile of the 
attitudes and characteristics of the parties involved in the Austrian household carry 
trades. We employ both univariate tests and multivariate (multinomial) logit 
regressions. 
We find that despite the noteworthy role of financial advisors in arranging the 
Swiss franc loans, our survey data suggests that risk-loving, wealthy and married 
households are more likely to take a housing loan in a foreign currency. Financially 
informed or high-income households are more likely to take a housing loan in 
general. These findings therefore may partially assuage potential policy concerns 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE 2. SPEARMAN CORRELATIONSBETWEENFINANCIAL EDUCATION AND RISK
AVERSION VARIABLES
This table lists the Spearman rank correlation coefficients between the financial education and risk 















































































































d(Negligent) 0.08 0.24 1
d(Passive) 0.14 0.16 0.09 1
d(Risk Aversion) 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.06 1
d(Bank Risk Aversion) -0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.04 0.06 1









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































FIGURE 2: LOANS TO HOUSEHOLDS IN FOREIGN CURRENCY:M ATURITY AND TYPE
OFAMORTIZATION,E ND-JUNE 2007 (EURBILLIONS)
    Type of amortization      
            
Remaining
maturity (in years) 







   Total 
                 
< 1  0.6 0.7 0.5     1.8 
1-2 0.3 0.2 0.2      0.7 
2-3 0.3 0.2 0.3      0.8 
3-4 0.3 0.1 0.3      0.7 
4-5 0.3 0.2 0.3      0.8 
5-7 0.6 0.3 0.9      1.8 
7-10 0.7 0.5 1.8      3 
10-15 0.9 0.9 5.4      7.2 
15-20 0.5 0.7 6.3      7.5 
>20 0.3 0.5 8      8.8 
               
             
Total 4.8 4.3 24.0      33.1 
          
Source: Oesterreichische Nationalbank     
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